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ABSTRACT
The question of Kurdish language rights has been a central issue in the Turkish–
Kurdish conﬂict. The current study examined endorsement of Kurdish language
rights in relation to intergroup factors (i.e. group identiﬁcations, cross-group
friendships, perceived discrimination, and perceived out-group beliefs about
state unity) among self-identiﬁed Turkish and Kurdish participants. The results
indicate that Turks were much less in favour of these rights than the Kurds. In
addition, for the Turks, higher national and ethnic identiﬁcation were
associated with lower support for Kurdish language rights, while cross-group
friendship, perceived discrimination of Kurds and the belief that Kurds
endorse national unity were associated with more support for rights. For the
Kurdish participants, stronger national identiﬁcation seems to undermine the
mobilizing meaning that Kurdish group identiﬁcation has for language rights
support. Furthermore, friendship with Turks can undermine the support for
rights because it strengthens national identiﬁcation and reduces ethnic
identiﬁcation.
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The social and political importance of minority rights in general and of linguis-
tic rights in particular (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1995) is widely
acknowledged. For example, the 1992 United Nations ‘Declaration on Minority
Rights’ emphasizes minority rights protection for all groups (Thornberry 1991),
and the continuing importance of these rights has been emphasized in the
UN’s Human Development Report (2004) and the Council of Europe’s report
(2014). The issue of minority and linguistic rights has been studied from differ-
ent perspectives, such as international law, human rights, history, political
science, and sociology. Not much attention has been paid, however, to
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people’s attitudes towards minority rights and the social psychological inter-
group factors explaining these attitudes (e.g. Evans and Need 2002; Verkuyten
and Yildiz 2006). In addition, existing studies tend to examine the dominant
majority group’s view on minority rights (e.g. Dixon and Ergin 2010) while
ignoring the perspective of minority groups.
We focused on the context of Turkey and examined the support for Kurdish
linguistic rights among self-identiﬁed Turks and Kurds.1 Language is at the
heart of the Turkish–Kurdish conﬂict and is an important deﬁning attribute
that ‘proves’ one’s separate and authentic group identity and provides
access to one’s culture (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1995). We investi-
gated to what extent the attitude towards Kurdish linguistic rights is related
to ethnic and national identiﬁcation, cross-group friendships, perceived dis-
crimination, and perceived endorsement of state unity by the out-group.
Our main aim was to investigate whether the role of these intergroup
factors in explaining the endorsement of Kurdish language rights differs
between self-identiﬁed Turks and Kurds. Empirical support for this expectation
would indicate that both groups do not only differ in their level of support of
Kurdish rights but also in the social psychological processes behind it.
Some recent studies investigated the Kurdish conﬂict but they used rela-
tively small samples and did not concentrate on minority rights (e.g. Bilali
2014; Çelik and Blum 2007; but see Dixon and Ergin 2010). Furthermore, inves-
tigating minority rights in Turkey is timely and appropriate because of the
peace process that began with the cease-ﬁre agreement between the
Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in 2013.
Linguistic minority rights
The language rights issue is more than about ‘just language’ and has to do
with power, inequality, and discrimination in society. Minority–majority
language hierarchies are politically and socially deﬁned (May 2006, 2011)
and in different countries and contexts, linguistic rights take different forms.
Yet, in most cases it is the dominant group that ultimately formulates these
rights (see Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1995).
There are various examples of language playing an identity deﬁning role in
ethnic and political conﬂicts, such as the Basque language marking Basque
identity in Spain (Echeverria 2003), and the marginalization of Uyghur as
the language of instruction in schools in the Uyghur autonomous area in
China (Minority Rights Group International 2008). Another example is the
Kurdish language in Turkey. Kurds are the largest ethnic minority group in
Turkey and compose around 18% of the population (Konda 2011).
The Turkish state historically adopted an ideology of centralized power,
and a single nation with a single language that resulted in the denial of the
existence of Kurdish language and identity. As in most other nationalisms,
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language was at the heart of the nation-building project. Turkish became a
deﬁning attribute of the modern Turkish national identity. The Turkish
state’s assimilationist practices resulted in a ban of the Kurdish language,
replacing Kurdish names of places and children with Turkish ones, in an
attempt of ‘Turkiﬁcation’ of the national identity on the basis of Turkish
language and culture (Zeydanlıoğlu 2012). The insurgent organization, the
PKK, initiated an armed attack against the Turkish army in 1984. Since then,
it is estimated that about 40,000 people have been killed in either attacks
by the PKK or as a result of the Turkish army’s military campaigns against
the PKK (Çelik and Kantowitz 2009).
In accordance with the European Union requirements, the Turkish state
initiated some legal reforms to give Kurdish citizens cultural rights. In 2003,
the law on Different languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens
in their daily lives allowed to teach Kurdish in private courses. A public televi-
sion channel in Kurdish and the establishment of an Institute of Living
Languages to provide post graduate education in Kurdish, are examples of
the changes introduced by the government, since the ‘Kurdish opening’
was initiated in 2009 (Kirişçi 2011).
In March 2013, PKK declared cease-ﬁre and the end of the armed struggle
era. In September 2013, new measures were launched by the government as
part of the peace process. This democratization package allows the use of
original Kurdish names of places, and the possibility of Kurdish language edu-
cation in private schools but not in public ones because of the provision in the
Turkish constitution that ‘Turkish is the sole ofﬁcial language in Turkey’
(Uçarlar and Derince 2012).
One of the prominent features of the Kurdish political movement is a claim
to ethnic and linguistic identity recognition. With this claim the unifying
narrative of the single Turkish national identity is challenged (Keyman
2012). Education in Kurdish language has become a political issue and
received the Kurdish community’s widespread support (Öpengin 2012). It
was argued that education in Kurdish is a human rights issue and that the
state is responsible for providing the conditions for this. Furthermore,
Turkish-only education policy in public schools was criticized for resulting in
academic failure and language loss for Kurdish speaking students (Uçarlar
and Derince 2012). It was recommended that a mother-tongue-based multi-
lingual education should be provided, especially in Kurdish-populated areas
(Çelik and Blum 2007; Derince 2012).
Group interests
For minority groups, minority rights offer the possibility of maintaining their
own distinctive culture and identity, and obtaining more equal social status
in society. Majority group members, on the other hand, might oppose
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minority rights because these are seen as a threat to the privileges and power
of one’s group and the unity of society. In their study of attitudes towards min-
ority rights in thirteen East European countries, Evans and Need (2002) found
that minority groups were much more in favour of minority rights than
majority groups. Furthermore, in a study in the Netherlands it was found
that Kurdish immigrants supported Kurdish minority rights in Turkey more
than Turkish immigrants (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2006). Hence, we expected
that in the context of Turkey, self-identiﬁed Kurds support Kurdish minority
rights more strongly than self-identiﬁed Turks. More importantly, however,
our aim was to investigate whether the role of several social psychological
factors explaining the endorsement of Kurdish language rights differs
between Turks and Kurds.
Ethnic identiﬁcation
Minority rights are about groups and group identities and therefore
strongly implicate group identiﬁcation processes. Research has demon-
strated that those individuals with high in-group identiﬁcation are more
worried about the status and position of their in-group than lower identi-
ﬁers (see Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 1999). This is particularly the case
when the value of the group identity is threatened and group interests
are at risk.
In conﬂict situations group identiﬁcation fosters in-group solidarity and
activism on behalf of one’s group, and high identiﬁers tend to be more con-
cerned about the continuity and rights of their group (Van Zomeren,
Postmes, and Spears 2008). Minority members who identify with their
ethnic in-group will consider it important to participate in social and political
life as group members while maintaining their own language and culture.
Therefore, supporting minority rights can be considered to be a collective
strategy for coping with a negative group identity and for challenging
group-based hierarchy and the status quo. For example, research shows
that for minority groups in the USA and Israel, a positive correlation exist
between in-group identiﬁcation and ideologies that challenge the legiti-
macy of the status hierarchy, whereas for majority groups a negative associ-
ation was found (Levin et al. 1998). Therefore, while we predict a positive
association between ethnic group identiﬁcation and the endorsement of
minority rights for the Kurdish participants, we expect a negative association
for the Turks. Because Turks are the national majority group, the more they
identify with their in-group, the more they can be expected to try to protect
their group interests and status position that is threatened by Kurdish min-
ority rights. Thus, for the Turkish participants higher ethnic identiﬁcation was
expected to be associated with lower endorsement of Kurdish linguistic
rights.
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National identiﬁcation
Whereas ethnic identiﬁcation can be expected to be differently associated
with the endorsement of Kurdish minority rights, national identiﬁcation is
likely to show a similar association among both groups of participants.
Turkish citizenship is based on the majority group’s language and culture
and there is a long history of Turkiﬁcation policies for minority groups with
the aim of creating an overarching national identity. In societies with an assim-
ilationist history, such as Turkey, a shared national identity tends to imply that
social cohesion is achieved by fostering the values of the majority group and
by undermining the identities of minority groups. Bilali (2014) shows that
among Turks and Kurds national identiﬁcation is associated with a similar
understandings of the Turkish–Kurdish conﬂict, in line with the ofﬁcial state
narrative of unity and intergroup harmony. For both groups higher national
identiﬁcation was related, for example, to lower endorsement of a minority
rights understanding of the conﬂict. Therefore, for both the Turkish and
Kurdish participants, we expected that higher national identiﬁcation will be
associated with lower support of Kurdish language rights.
Dual identity
For many Turks, national and ethnic identity are highly important, very closely
related and quite similar in meaning (Bilali 2014). The Turkish constitution
deﬁnes a Turkish citizen as a ‘Turk’, and this term is used interchangeably
to refer to the ethnicity and nationality of ethnic Turkish persons. For the
Kurds, however, there tends to be a distinction between ethnic and national
identity making it possible to examine the role of dual identity in the endorse-
ment of Kurdish language rights.
In their social psychological analysis of collective action, Simon and Klan-
dermans (2001) argue that a politicized collective identity is typically a dual
identity, because of the combination of perceptions of injustice derived
from identiﬁcation with the ethnic minority group with feelings of entitlement
derived from identiﬁcation with society. This means that dual identity should
stimulate the endorsement of minority rights and minority collective actions,
and there is supporting empirical evidence for this among immigrant groups
(e.g. Fischer-Neumann 2014; Simon and Grabow 2010). The theoretical
reasoning about politicized dual identity leads to the prediction that self-
identiﬁed Kurds with a stronger dual identity will endorse Kurdish minority
rights more strongly (dual identity model).
Yet, the situation of non-immigrant minority groups in historically assimila-
tionist societies might be different. A shared national identity that emphasizes
the majority groups’ norms, values, and language for promoting unity and
harmony deﬂects attention from intergroup inequalities and undermines
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minority group’s culture and demands for equal group rights (Bilali 2014;
Saguy et al. 2009). In contrast to the politicized dual identity model this
would mean that when national identiﬁcation is relatively high, stronger
ethnic minority group identiﬁcation does not promotes activism on behalf
of one’s own minority group. This leads to the contrasting prediction that
self-identiﬁed Kurds with a stronger dual identity will endorse Kurdish min-
ority rights less strongly (minority identity model). In testing these two predic-
tions we follow previous research and examined dual identity in terms of the
combination of ethnic and national group identiﬁcations (e.g. Fleischmann,
Phalet, and Swyngedouw 2013; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014). Thus,
ethnic and national identiﬁcation were expected to interact in predicting
support for Kurdish language rights
Perceived discrimination
The question of minority rights is closely linked to the value of equality and is
appreciated as an essential approach for addressing inequalities and struc-
tural discrimination in the society. It is not sufﬁcient that ethnic groups can
maintain their culture, they should also be able to take part equally in the
society. Research has shown that acknowledgment of discrimination of min-
ority groups is positively related to the support for minority rights (Verkuyten
and Yildiz 2006). Therefore, we predict that higher perception of discrimi-
nation of Kurds will be associated with stronger endorsement of minority
rights. In other words, people who perceive more discrimination are expected
to be more in favour of these rights and this association is expected for both
groups of Turks and Kurds.
Cross-group friendships
The contact hypothesis, proposed by Allport (1954), posits that cross-group
contact results in more positive attitudes towards the out-group. For majority
group members a great number of studies provide supporting evidence for
this proposition, also in relation to support for afﬁrmative action and other
policies to redress inequalities (see Pettigrew and Tropp 2011). Cross-group
friendships in particular are effective in improving out-group attitudes. This
means that it can be expected that for the self-identiﬁed Turkish participants
a higher number of Kurdish close friends is associated with a stronger endor-
sement of Kurdish minority rights.
Cross-group friendship can have a different impact for Kurdish people. Posi-
tive contact generally improves intergroup attitudes. For minority members
this may imply a lower perception of inequality and injustice, and less readiness
to support regulations and initiatives to expose and redress inequalities and dis-
advantages and to demand for change (Reicher 2007). Contact can lead to
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perceiving greater similarity between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and amore positive charac-
terization of the advantagedmajority group. Because of the positive contact, one
comes to like and trust the advantaged, and it is difﬁcult to riseupagainst friends.
Research in Israel, India, South Africa, and the USA has demonstrated that posi-
tive contact is associated with more favourable attitudes towards the advan-
taged majority group and at the same time with reduced awareness of group
inequality and decreased support for social change (e.g. Dixon, Durrheim, and
Tredoux 2007; Saguy et al. 2009). This leads to the prediction that for self-ident-
iﬁed Kurds a higher number of Turkish close friends is associated with lower
support for Kurdish minority rights.
Meta-perception of national unity
Minority rights are often contested on the basis of concerns for the unity and
stability of the country. According to this view, cultural diversity and group
rights increase the possibility of conﬂict and weaken social cohesion and
the unity of the state (see Barry 2001). Hence, the more important state
unity is considered to be the less participants tend to endorse Kurdish min-
ority rights (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2006).
Herewedonot focus onparticipants’ownviews but rather on so-calledmeta-
perceptions: the perception of the importance attached to national unity by the
out-group. Meta-perceptions, or what one thinks that the out-group thinks or
wants, have been found to be important for prejudicial attitudes and trust of
out-groups (Vorauer,Main, andO’Connell 1998; Shelton, Richeson, and Salvatore
2005). In Turkey meta-perceptions about national unity are relevant because
ethnic Turks often think that the Kurdish claim for minority rights challenges
or undermines the unity of the Turkish state (Kentel, Ahıska, and Genç 2007).
This could mean that Turks accept Kurdish minority rights less when they
think that Kurds do not support national unity. Phrased positively, this leads to
the expectation that Turkish participantswill bemore supportive of Kurdishmin-
ority rights when they think that among the Kurds there is the belief that all citi-
zens belong to the same nation state and should work together.
In contrast when Kurdish participants believe that themajority group of Turks
strongly endorses national unity and harmony they might be less in favour of
Kurdish language rights. The reason is thatwhenKurdsbelieve thatTurks empha-
size national unity they might be afraid that an emphasis on Kurdish rights
creates a backlash in the form of strengthening of assimilation policies for creat-
ing a uniﬁed nation state based on Turkish ethno-cultural identity (Çelik 2000).
In summary
To summarize, we expected self-identiﬁed Kurds to support Kurdish language
rights more than self-identiﬁed Turks, and that higher ethnic identiﬁcation is
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related to stronger support of these rights among the Kurds and to weaker
support among the Turks. Furthermore and for both the Turks and Kurds,
national identiﬁcation was expected to be associated with lower support of
Kurdish language rights. Additionally, we explored among the Kurdish partici-
pants whether a stronger dual identity was related to higher support of
language rights (politicized dual identity) or rather lower support (politicized
minority identity). A higher number of cross-group friendships was expected
to be associated with weaker support of Kurdish language rights among the
Kurds but to stronger rights support among the Turks. Higher perceived dis-
crimination of the Kurds was expected to be associated with stronger support
of Kurdish language rights among both groups of participants. Finally, for the
Turkish participants the perception that Kurds endorse national unity and
harmony was expected to be positively associated with support for Kurdish
language rights. In contrast, for the Kurdish participants the perceived endor-
sement of national unity by the Turks was expected to be negatively associ-
ated to the support of language rights.
Method
Participants
Because the Kurdish conﬂict is a politically sensitive topic in Turkey, it is difﬁ-
cult to recruit participants and conduct studies on it. We managed to involve
relatively large and comparable samples of Turkish and Kurdish students
whereas previous research has used small samples (e.g. Bilali 2014; Bilali,
Tropp, and Dasgupta 2012). The data was collected in 2012 among 625 par-
ticipants from 8 colleges and universities in 7 cities who participated voluntary
and anonymously in a research on societal issues in contemporary Turkey. In
2012, the political climate regarding the Kurdish conﬂict was relatively stable.
It was after the democratic/Kurdish opening in 2009 initiated by the govern-
ment and before the cease-ﬁre agreement in March 2013.
Of the participants, 54% self-identiﬁed as Turkish and 46% as Kurdish. We
used the well-known self-identiﬁcation method because in this way partici-
pants themselves decide about their ethnic group membership. Of the partici-
pants 54% was female (46%male) and they were between 18 and 27 years old
(M = 21.17, SD = 1.88). On a question with a seven-point scale, the participants
described the economic status of their families as middle class (M = 4.0, SD
= .89). The Kurds had a somewhat lower perceived economic status than
the Turks (M = 3.84, SD = .98, and M = 4.17, SD = .77, respectively, t = 5.63, p
< .001). On a political self-placement scale (ten-point scale) participants
placed themselves slightly to the left on the political spectrum (M = 4.82,
SD = 2.19) with the Kurds (M = 3.75, SD = 2.01) placing themselves more at
the left of the scale than the Turks (M = 5.72, SD = 1.96), t = 12.66, p < .001.
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Measures
Support of Kurdish language rights was measured with seven items (ﬁve-point
scales) related to current debates in Turkey and adapted from previous
research (e.g. Verkuyten and Yildiz 2006). Three sample items are, ‘people
have a right to use Kurdish language in public life’, ‘The governmental
ofﬁces (e.g. the parliament, hospitals, and judicial system) should provide ser-
vices in both Turkish and Kurdish languages’, and ‘Kurdish language should be
allowed in the media’. A scale based on the seven items had high reliability
(alpha = .94 for Turks; alpha = .95 for the Kurds).
Ethnic and national identiﬁcation were each measured with four items (ﬁve-
point scales). These items were adapted from previous research among
Turkish and Kurdish participants (e.g. Verkuyten and Yildiz 2006). Ethnic
identiﬁcation was measured ﬁrst and participants were asked to indicate
themselves the ethnic group they belonged to and subsequently to indicate
how strongly they identiﬁed with this group (e.g. ‘My ethnic group is very
important for how I see myself’, ‘I strongly identify with people of my
ethnic group’). The national identiﬁcation items speciﬁed national citizenship
(e.g. ‘I am proud to be a citizen of Turkey’, ‘I have a strong feeling of being a
citizen of Turkey’). The ethnic identiﬁcation items (alpha = .89 for Kurds as well
as Turks) and the national identiﬁcation items (alpha = .87 for Kurds, alpha
= .92 for Turks) revealed high reliability. We found that the items used for
the measurement of ethnic and national identiﬁcation represented two differ-
ent constructs, using Principal Components Analysis with Oblimin Rotation.
Perception of discrimination
Perception of discrimination was measured by two items: ‘In general, how
often are Kurds being discriminated in daily life?’ and ‘In general, how often
are Kurds being discriminated in schools or at work?’ The items are strongly
correlated (r = .87). An average score of these items was computed.
Cross-group friendships the Turkish and Kurdish participants were asked to
indicate how many of their close friends were, respectively, Kurdish and
Turkish. A ﬁve-point scale was used with the response categories, None (1),
Around 1/4th (2), Around half (3), Around 3/4rd (4), and Almost all (5).
The perceived endorsement (meta-perception) of national unity was
measured with two items (ﬁve-point scales). Participants were asked to indi-
cate their agreement with two questions concerning the perceived belief of
the out-group: ‘there is among the Kurds [Turks] a strong feeling that we all
belong to the same nation state’ and ‘there is among the Kurds [Turks] the
feeling that we are one country and should work together’. For both groups
of participants the items are strongly correlated (r = .88). Hence, for both
the Turkish and Kurdish participants a measure of perceived out-group endor-
sement of national unity was computed.
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Analyses
On a number of items the number of missing values was above 5% and these
missings were imputed by means of Expectation Maximization in SPSS. All
analyses were repeated using the non-imputed data in order to see
whether this affected the results. Since the results did not differ substantively,
the imputed dataset was used.
Results
Descriptive ﬁndings
As shown in Table 1, there were signiﬁcant differences between Kurds and
Turks for all measures except for perceived out-group national unity. The
Kurds had higher ethnic and lower national identiﬁcation than the Turks. Fur-
thermore, it appears that the Kurds had more Turkish close friends than the
Turkish participants had Kurdish friends. Additionally, the Kurds compared
to the Turks perceived more discrimination of the Kurds.
Ethnic and national identiﬁcation were not only relatively high among the
Turkish participants but they were also strongly correlated (Table 2). In con-
trast, among the Kurdish participants the association between ethnic and
national identiﬁcation is negative and the two identiﬁcations show contrast-
ing associations with the other measures.
Support of Kurdish language rights
We examined the support of Kurdish language rights using stepwise linear
regression. In the ﬁrst step of the model we included the different variables
and in the second step we added the interactions between ethnic group
and the explanatory variables. The ﬁndings are presented in Table 3. In
Step 1, there were no signiﬁcant effects for age, gender, perceived SES, and
political orientation (not shown in Table 3), but a strong effect for ethnic
group. Not surprisingly, the Kurdish participants were much stronger in
Table 1. Means and standard deviations for the main measures and for the Turkish (N =
376) and Kurdish (N = 320) participants.
Turks Kurds
t-ValueM SD M SD
Ethnic identiﬁcation 3.22 1.16 3.44 1.21 2.49*
National identiﬁcation 3.95 1.41 2.29 1.30 17.78***
Cross-group friendships 1.94 0.63 2.59 0.89 10.96***
Discrimination of Kurds 3.08 1.02 4.03 1.01 12.31***
Out-group national unity 2.60 1.28 2.66 1.47 0.55
Kurdish language rights 2.15 1.18 4.53 0.89 30.22**
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
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favour of Kurdish language rights than the Turks (see Table 1). Furthermore
and as expected, higher national identiﬁers were less supportive of Kurdish
rights, and higher perceived discrimination of the Kurds was associated
with stronger support for Kurdish rights. In addition there were signiﬁcant
main effects for cross-group friendships and perceived out-group beliefs
about national unity but these effects were qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant inter-
action with ethnic group in Step 2. The interaction between ethnic identiﬁ-
cation and ethnic group was also signiﬁcant in the second step of the
regression analysis (Table 3).
To examine these interactions we conducted regression analyses separ-
ately for the Turkish and Kurdish participants. For both Kurds and Turks,
higher national identiﬁcation was associated with lower support of Kurdish
rights (β =−.29, t = 4.48, p < .001, and β =−.33, t = 5.75, p < .001, respectively),
and more discrimination of the Kurds was associated with stronger support of
Kurdish rights (β = .15, t = 2.64, p < .01, and β = .19, t = 4.35, p < .01, for Kurds
and Turks, respectively). For the Kurds, higher ethnic identiﬁcation was associ-
ated with stronger endorsement of Kurdish language rights (β = .17, t = 3.12,
p < .01), while Turks who identiﬁed more strongly with their ethnic group
Table 2. Correlations between the different measures and for the two groups of
participants: Turks below and Kurds above the diagonal.
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Ethnic identiﬁcation – −.21** −.30** .24** −.08 .29**
2. National identiﬁcation .66** – .29** −.41** .51** −.46**
3. Cross-group friendships −.19** −.15* – −.27** .18** −.23**
4. Discrimination Kurds −.15* −.28** .09 – −.27** .37**
5. Out-group national unity .06 .11* .15** −.02 – −.31**
6. Kurdish language rights −.47** −.51** .26** .31** .14* –
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
Table 3. Regression analysis explaining support for Kurdish language rights:
standardized regression coefﬁcients and standard errors in brackets.
Step 1 Step 2
Ethnic group (Kurds) .46** (.11) .53** (.08)
Ethnic identiﬁcation −.04 (.03) −.17** (.05)
National identiﬁcation −.36** (.03) −.31** (.05)
Cross-group friendships .05* (.05) .16** (.08)
Discrimination Kurds .15** (.04) .15** (.05)
Out-group national unity .07** (.03) .13** (.04)
Ethnic idenf. × group .43** (.07)
National idenf. × group .11 (.07)
Friendship × group −.31** (.10)
Discrimination × group −.08 (.07)
Out-group unity × group −.21** (.05)
R2 change .68 .03
F-value 143.63** 14.81**
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
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supported the endorsement of Kurdish rights less (β =−.22, t = 3.92, p < .01).
Perceived importance attached to national unity by the out-group was a
signiﬁcant predictor among the Turks but not the Kurds (β =−.09, t = 1.51,
p > .05). As expected, the more the Turkish participants thought that the
Kurds endorse national unity the more they accepted Kurdish language
rights (β = .16, t = 3.77, p < .01). Also cross-group friendship was a signiﬁcant
predictor only for the Turkish participants (β = .16, t = 3.80, p < .01), with
having more Kurdish friends being related to stronger support for Kurdish
language rights (for the Kurds, β =−.04, t = .77, p > .05).
Dual identity
We examined for the Kurdish participants whether dual identity had an
additional effect on the support of Kurdish language rights by adding in a
third step of the regression analysis the interaction term between ethnic
and national identiﬁcation (centred scores). The results show that this inter-
action was signiﬁcant (β = .15, t = 3.08, p = .002). Simple slope analyses indi-
cated that higher ethnic identiﬁcation was not related to stronger support
for Kurdish language rights when national identiﬁcation was relatively high
(1 SD above the mean; β = .04, t = .54, p > .10). Yet, when national identiﬁ-
cation was relatively low (1 SD below the mean), ethnic identiﬁcation was
associated with support for Kurdish language rights (β = .30, t = 4.32, p
< .001). This pattern of ﬁndings is in agreement with the minority identity
model and not with the dual identity model.
Discussion
The question of the right to use Kurdish language in public life and institutions
is a central issue in the Turkish–Kurdish conﬂict. The present results show that
Turks were much less in favour of these rights than Kurds. More importantly,
we found that for both ethnic groups some of the intergroup factors are simi-
larly related to the support of Kurdish language rights while others show con-
trasting effects. This indicates that self-identiﬁed Turks and Kurds do not only
tend to differ in their level of support but also in the role of some of the social
psychological processes underlying their support.
To start with the commonalities, the ﬁndings demonstrate that among
both groups higher national identiﬁcation was associated with lower
support for Kurdish language rights, and higher perceived discrimination of
Kurds with higher support. The latter ﬁnding indicates that the recognition
of pervasive inequalities represents a more general argument for accepting
and endorsing minority rights (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2006). This argument is
central in debates on minority rights and appears to inﬂuence people’s
views in similar ways, independently of their majority or minority group
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position: also Turkish participants supported Kurdish language rights more
when they recognized the discrimination that Kurds experience.
The former ﬁnding indicates the possible political downside of national
identiﬁcation for minority groups in a society with a long history of assimila-
tionist policies (Bilali 2014). The literature tends to point at the positive conse-
quences of a shared national identity for intergroup relations in society, and
for the resolution of conﬂicts (see Schildkraut 2014). Emphasizing a
common national identity draws attention away from intergroup disparities
and stimulates a feeling of shared belonging and the endorsement of the uni-
fying discourse (Keyman 2012). This, however, can have negative implications
for minority groups because it ignores their grievances and interests and
thereby undermines their demands for group rights. Both the Turkish and
Kurdish participants who identiﬁed more strongly as Turkish citizens were
less supportive of Kurdish language rights.
This political downside becomes even clearer in combination with ethnic
identiﬁcation. Collective action is more likely when one identiﬁes strongly
with one’s disadvantaged minority group (Van Zomeren, Postmes, and
Spears 2008). Among the Kurdish participants higher ethnic identiﬁcation
was associated with stronger support for Kurdish language rights, but in par-
ticular for participants who did not simultaneously identify with the Turkish
nation. This ﬁnding is in contrast to research on politicized dual identity
among immigrant groups (Simon and Grabow 2010; Fischer-Neumann
2014), but in support of a politicized ethnic identity. For Kurdish participants
who identify with Turkey, higher ethnic identiﬁcation was not associated with
stronger endorsement of the importance of recognizing the right of Kurds to
publicly use their own language. This indicates that national identiﬁcation can
undermine the perceptions of injustice and feelings of entitlement derived
from ethnic minority group identiﬁcation.
We found no evidence that for the Kurds cross-group friendship had a
similar undermining effect. For them, cross-group friendship was not associ-
ated with lower endorsement of their linguistic rights. This ﬁnding does not
support recent theoretical reasoning and empirical research that demon-
strates that for disadvantaged groups positive contact can be associated
with reduced awareness of group inequality and decreased support for
social change (e.g. Dixon, Durrheim, and Tredoux 2007; Saguy et al. 2009).
The correlation between cross-group friendship and support for language
rights was indeed negative, but in the regression analysis friendship had no
independent effect on the support for Kurdish rights. Higher cross-group
friendship was also associated with lower ethnic identiﬁcation, lower per-
ceived discrimination and higher national identiﬁcation. This might indicate
that friendships with Turks lead, for example, to lower Kurdish identiﬁcation
and therefore to less endorsement of Kurdish minority rights, or that friend-
ships lead to higher national identiﬁcation and therefore to less endorsement
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of these rights. These types of indirect effects of cross-group friendship should
be examined in future studies and would indicate that cross-group friendship
can have an indirect political undermining effect for disadvantaged minority
groups (Wright and Lubensky 2009).2
Among the Turks more friendships with Kurds was independently associ-
atedwith stronger support of Kurdish rights. This pattern of ﬁndings is in agree-
mentwith the research literature that shows that positive effects of cross-group
interaction are considerably stronger among advantaged majorities than for
disadvantaged minorities (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011). It further indicates
that cross-group friendship can weaken the support for unequal practices
and rights. Because successful social change requires recognition by the advan-
taged of the unequal and unfair hierarchical situation, this ﬁnding suggest that
the development of cross-group friendship has promise for social change.
Future studies should further examine the role of cross-group friendship in
the support for equal social policies in post conﬂict societies.
For the Turks, more cross-group friendship was associated with a stronger
belief that the Kurds attach importance to national unity. This meta-percep-
tion was independently associated with higher support for Kurdish linguistic
rights. Thus, when the Kurds were seen as endorsing national unity, Turkish
participants were less reluctant to accept the use of Kurdish language in poli-
tics, government, the media and public life. This demonstrates that for Turks
the belief about whether Kurds support or rather challenge the unity of the
Turkish state matters for their willingness to accept minority rights that are
sometimes construed as undermining this very unity (Kentel, Ahıska, and
Genç 2007; Konda 2011). More generally, this ﬁnding conﬁrms the relevance
of meta-perceptions for out-group attitudes (Vorauer, Main, and O’Connell
1998; Shelton, Richeson, and Salvatore 2005). It is not only what oneself
thinks and beliefs but also what one thinks that the out-group wants and
does that determines people’s out-group attitudes. Yet, there was no evi-
dence that this meta-perception played an independent role in the Kurdish
support for Kurdish rights. Kurdish participants who believed that Turks
emphasize national unity did not show less support of these rights.
Some limitations of the current study should be noted. First of all, the
‘Kurdish question’ in Turkey is politically quite sensitive making it rather chal-
lenging to conduct research on it. Nevertheless and in contrast to previous
studies with relatively small samples (e.g. Bilali 2014), we managed to
collect data among relatively large and comparable student samples of
Turks and Kurds. The ﬁndings make an important contribute to our under-
standing of the endorsement of linguistic minority rights, but it is unclear
whether they can be generalized to the population or to other settings in
which these rights are politically challenged. Some of the ﬁndings on group
identiﬁcations are parallel to other studies (e.g. Dixon and Ergin 2010; Bilali
2014) suggesting that the ﬁndings have more general meaning. In addition,
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the results support our theoretically derived predictions and describe some of
the important intergroup dynamics of the ways that minority rights are eval-
uated in the Turkish–Kurdish conﬂict.
Since we assessed our predictions using correlational data we cannot
evaluate the causal direction of the relationships. It is rather difﬁcult to use
an experimental design for manipulating variables such as cross-ethnic friend-
ship and ethnic and national identiﬁcation because of the sensitive nature of
the political climate (but see Čehajić, Brown, and Castano 2008). In addition, to
our knowledge, no relevant longitudinal data are available in Turkey.
To conclude, the present research suggests that advantaged and disadvan-
taged groups in an intractable conﬂict do not only differ in their support for
minority rights but also in some of the underlying social psychological corre-
lates. For the Turks, higher national and ethnic identiﬁcation were associated
with lower support for Kurdish linguistic rights, while cross-group friendship,
perceived discrimination of Kurds and the belief that Kurds endorse national
unity were associated with more support for rights. This indicates that
among the Turks there are perceptions, beliefs and social interactions that
work against, and others that stimulate, the endorsement of Kurdish linguistic
rights. For the Kurdish participants there is evidence that national identiﬁcation
has negative implications for the Kurdish struggle to gain more rights and an
equal social standing (Bilali 2014). Stronger national identiﬁcation seems to
undermine the mobilizing meaning that Kurdish group identiﬁcation has for
linguistic rights support. Furthermore, friendship with Turks can undermine
the support for Kurdish linguistic rights because it strengthens national identi-
ﬁcation and reduces ethnic identiﬁcation (Note 1). These are important ﬁndings
that improve our understanding of majority and minority group members’
support of linguistic minority rights in assimilationist contexts and provide
possible directions for measures to develop a sustainable peace process after
a violent conﬂict. The ﬁndings further show that there are relevant individual
differences within both ethnic groups, such as for ethnic and national identiﬁ-
cations, group perceptions, and cross-group friendships. This means that
neither the Kurds nor the Turks are a homogenous group. Within both
groups there is a diversity of beliefs and views that are important for the evalu-
ation of the Turkish–Kurdish conﬂict and Kurdish linguistic rights, and some of
these differences were examined in the current study.
Notes
1. Language is an important marker of Turkish and Kurdish identity but this does not
mean that all Kurds speak Kurdish or no Turks speak it. Yet, here we are interested in
the importance of ethnic self-identiﬁcation.
2. We conducted several stepwise regression analyses to explore which of the poss-
ible mediating relations is most likely in our dataset. The signiﬁcant independent
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effect in Step 1 of higher friendship with Turks being associated with lower endor-
sement of Kurdish minority rights (β =−.23, t = 4.23, p < .01), was most strongly
reduced (β =−.11, t = 2.08, p = .038) when national identiﬁcation was added to
the regression equation in Step 2, and the further addition of ethnic identiﬁcation
yielded a non-signiﬁcant effect for cross-group friendship (β =−.06, t = 1.14,
p > .05). This suggests that more Turkish friends is related to stronger national
identiﬁcation and weaker Kurdish identiﬁcation and therefore to weaker endorse-
ment of Kurdish language rights.
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